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The Sarbllne.\' - Oxh~y ACI and Ih e Securilies Exchange Commission mo ve 100 
quickly when Ih ey prod Ih e Filloncial ACCOllllfillg SUllldards Board, the 
.\"UlI1dard seifer f or US GAAP, 10 //love i/llmedim ely 10 {/ principles-based 
system. Priorities respectil1g reform o. f corporate reporling in1he us need to be 
ordered more care.fidly. Incenfive probfems impairing audi1 peliormance 
should be solved ji rs1 !hraIl gh ins! i 1IIt iOl1ll1 reform i I1.Hllo! ing the aud il frol1l I he 
negative impact of rent-seeking alld solving adl'crse seleclion problems 
otherwise affecting audit practice. So long liS ollditor independence lIlld 
1I1{/1wge1l1 f!llt il/ celllipes respecting lICCOllllfil1g freaf/llents reI/will slispect. Ihe 
US reporting system holds Oll! 110 actor plausibly posifiul1ed 10 take responsi-
bili1y /or Ihe delicate IOIlH oJoct applications thaI are Ihe hallmarks ofprinci -
pIes-based SyS fl'IIIS. Pril1cip'e.~· . IOkel1 alone, do hl1le to cOlls frain rent-seeking 
Proressor or Law_ Georgetown Uni versity Law Center. 
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behaviour. /11 a world of caprured regulators, they invite applications rhat sllit 
the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their flaws, better cOllstrain 
managers and compromised au.ditors. Broadbrush reformulations of rules-
based GAAP shouldial/ow Dilly when illstitutional reforms have succeeded. 
Keywords: corporation and securities law, illegal behaviour and the enforce-
ment of law, accounting and auditing genera l. 
I. I NTRODUCTION 
American equityholders awoke in 2002 to realize they no longer could trust 
corporate financial reports. I Their doubts extended beyond Enron and the Arthur 
Andersen finn! to a large set of companies with reputations for aggressive 
accounting. Entire sectors were implicated, finance and telecommunications 
most prominently. Securities issuers, oriented toward shareholder value enhance-
ment by the corporate culture of the 1990s, had been adopting aggressive, even 
fraudulent treatments to enhance reponed eanlings, and their auditors had been 
doing nothing to stop them. The auditors had sold their independence in 
exchange for consulting rents. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
some years before, had issued loud warnings about this dillY deal and its implica-
tions for reporting quality:' But nobody in the investment community paid 
attention so long as money kept falling from the sky during the 1990s bull markel. 
Things were different in 2002. As equityholders struggled in the worst bear 
market in a generation, diminished auditor independence triggered a crisis of 
I See. e.g .. G. Morgensoll, 'Womes of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding'. 
N. Y. Times (30 January 2002) p. C I. 
~ For a review of Enron disaster, see W.W. Brallon, 'Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value', 76 7illalle L Rev. (2002) p. 1275 . 
. 1 See. e.g .. A. Levitt. 'Renewing the Covenant With investors' , Speech given at the New 
York University Cenler for Law and Busi ness ( 10 May 2000) (available at <www.sec.gov/llews/ 
speechlspch> (last visited 25 January 2(04». 
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confidence in corporate reporting. As audit failures·1 piled up, investors lost 
confidence in managers, market inte rmediari es, and auditors alike. Share prices 
suffered as a resul t. 
The audiwrs responded by pointing a fin ger at US accoun ting's standard-
seller, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the standards it 
articulates, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAA P). The problem, 
said the auditors, was a shortage of rules. Auditors and reporting companies 
needed more guidance and regulators like FASB had failed to supply it. Joe 
Berardino, the manag ing partner of the Andersen firm , then under the gun for the 
audit failure at Enron and subsequent document shredding, led this counter-
attack. His fi rm's auditors, he said, had merely applied the rules. It followed that 
if there was a prob lem, it lay in the rules themselves, which pemljued the orf 
ba lance shee t financing arrangements that figured prominently in Enron's 
co llapse. If something had gone wrong with the fairness of Enron's financial 
statements, then the rules ought to be ret hought :~ The burden to effect improve-
ment lay on the FASB and the SEC rather than on the aud it firms: to restore contl -
dence, the SEC should suppl y ' immediate guidance ' to public companies 
respecting d isclosure of off-balance sheet transactions along wilh other 
transac tional categories where Enron's financials had proved wanling, such as 
over the counter deri vat ive contracts and related-part y transactions. In parti cular, 
the SEC should require issuers to prov ide more details respec ting off balance 
sheet guarantees, commitments, and lease and debt arra ngements thaI variously 
impact on cred it ratings, earn ings, cash now, or slack price." 
The decline in comp liance has nO! been limited to companies subject to enforce ment 
actions. sllch as Cendant: see I II re Cel/da/lf Cmp. Sec Ulig .. 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J . 2000). 
Investigat ions and cri tici sms touch reputable names sLich as Xerox: see C. Deutsch and R. 
Abelson. ·Xerox Facing New Pressures Over Audit ing·. N.Y. Tillll'.I" (9 February 2001) p. CL 
Lucent: S. Romero. ·Luce nt" s Boob Said to Draw Attent ion of the SEC". N.Y. Tilll!'x ( 10 
February 200 I) p. C I; American Internation;ll. Coca Cola. and IB M: see S. Liesm;l ll. ·Heard on 
the Street: Deci phering the Black Box·. Woll 51. 1. (23 Jammry 20(2): and General Electric itself. 
See J. Kah n . • Accounting in Wonderland: Jeremy Kahn Goes Down the Rabbi t Hole with G. E.·s 
Books ·. FO/"l/ll/(' (19 March 20(1) p. 37: R.E. Siivel"llWl and K. Brown. ·Five Companies: How 
T hey Get Thei r Numbers·. Wall 51.1. (23 J;muary 2002) pp. C I. C 16. 
The General Accounting Office Reporlto IheChairman. Comm ittee 0 11 Banki ng. Housi ng, ;mel 
Urb,Hl Affairs. U.S. Senate. Fil/(/l/citl/ RII.I·InIIlIllI'III.\": Trllll(/s. Markel IlI/pm·I.\". Rl'gu/lII(J}Y 
RI'.VWI1.I·l'.I·. ami Rl' II](1illill,!:. C/wllellge.\· (October 2002) (GAO-OJ- JJ8) [hereafter cited as GA a 
Rep0J"/I. surveys public company restatements 1997 to 2002. showi ng marked increases across 
the period . 
. < J . Berardino. ·Enron: A Wake-Up CIII·. Wall SI. J. (4 December 2001) p. A 18 . 
• J. BlIrns and M. Schroeder. ·Accoull1ing Firms Ask SEC for Post-EnrOll Guide·. \Vult SI. J. 
(7 January 2002) p. A I 6. 
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The auditors repeated an o rr-heard refrain when they demanded more 
guidance from the standard setters, and so failed to deflect the blame from 
themselves. Worse, voices from outside the accounting profession responded to 
the auditors' defense by singing the opposite t.une: Maybe the auditors had too 
much guidance; maybe the problem was nOI a shortage of rules on matters like 
off-balance sheet financing, derivati ve contracts, and leases, but an excess of 
rules. The critics charged that GAAP's exhaustive sysrem of rules-based treat-
ments had fostered a dysfunclionai , check-the-box approach to compliance. 
Preparers and auditors applied the rules mechanically, ignoring the substance of 
the transactions being reported. ' The rules-based system of regulation, they 
alleged, fos tered a culture of noncompliance in which regulated actors invested 
in schemes of rule evasion. Harvey Piu, then the SEC chairman, led the charge 
against FASB and its rules: 
'Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far too detailed pre-
scripti ve requirements for companies and their accountants to fo llow. We seek to 
move toward a principles-based set of accounting standards, where mere compli -
ance with technical prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective." 
Capital Hill staffers, press commentators, and academics seconded Pin in 
blaming the cris is on the rules and calling for principles-based accounting. 
Even Wall Street joined the call for principles, in a rare moment of concur-
rence with the policy community. Of course, Wall Street's motivation lay in the 
assoc iation of principles-based accounting with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the Jnternational Accou nting Standards 
Board (lASS) and selec ted for adoption by the European Commission .9 The 
case for principles-based accou nting overlaps the case for regulatory interven-
tion to speed internat ional securities market convergence, in particular SEC 
acceptance of financial reporting pursuant to [fRS. Principles-based 
accounting thus appeals to every intermediary on Wall Street anticipating more 
rents from foreign listing business. 
1 S. Liesman. 'SEC Accounting Cop's Warning: Playing By Rules May Not Ward Off Fraud 
Issues', Wall 51. J. (12 February 2002) p. CI: 'Leaders: The Lessons from Enron', Ecollollli.w (9 
February 2002) pp. 9- 10 . 
• H.L. Pin, Testimony Concerni ng The Corporate and Auditing Accountabil ity. Responsi-
bility, and Transparence Act, Committee on Fi nancial Services. House of Representatives p. 5. 
Avai lable on the SEC website at <http: www.sec.gov/news/testintony/032002tsh lp.htm> (last 
visited 26 January 20(4) . 
• Effective in 2005, li sted companies in the EC will be requ ired to report under lFRS. 
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The way Ihus prepared , [he US Congress made its own call for principles 
when il enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA),'" the legislation that 
addresses the reporting cri sis and auempts to res tore confidence in the securities 
markets. SOA institutes a new regime of regulation of the accounting profes-
sion , following the standard regulatory strategy of delegat ing the task of fillin g 
in the new regime's terms to a new administrative agency, the Public Company 
Accounting O versight Board (PCAOB). " On principles-based accounting, in 
contrast, SOA relies on the o ld agency, the SEC, ordering it to produce a study 
of the US accounting system that ascerlains the extent to which it is principles-
based (as opposed to rules-based) and reports on the length of time needed to 
achieve transition to a basis in principles. '! The SEC Report, wh ich has 
appeared in due course, II confirms the relalive superiority of principles-based 
over rutes-based accounting and hands to FASB the job of a ground up 
reconstruction of US GAAP. 
'" Sarbanes-Oxley ACI of 2002. Pub. Law. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
secti ons of II . 15. IS. 28, and 29 U .S.c.). 
" Sarbanes-Ox ley Act s. 103 (c), 
'! Sarbane~-Ox ley Act s. lOS (d) provides as follows: 
SEC. lOS. ACCOUNTI NG STA NDARDS. 
(dl STUDY AND REPORT ON ADOPTING PRI NCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING-
I I) STUDY -
(A) IN GENERAL - The Commission shall conduct a study on the adoption by the Un ited States 
fi nanc ial reporting sy:-tem of a principl es-based accounting system. 
(B) ST UDY TOPICS - The st udy required by subparag.raph (A) shall include an exami nation of-
(i ) the extent to which principles-based accounti ng. and financial reporting. exists in the United 
States: 
(ii ) the length of time required for change from a ru les-based \0 a principles-bm;ed financial 
reporting system: 
(i ii) the feas ibility of and proposed methods by which a principles· hascd !-iystem may be imple-
mented; and 
(iv) a thorough economic ana lysis of the illlpkrnenl:uinn of a pri lKiples-based syslem. 
(2) REPORT - Not later than I year ,Ifter 1 IlL' d;I(~ Ilf e n:H: ( IIl~n( M [hi s Act. the Commission shall 
submit a report on the results of the study r~l]uir..: d hy p;II':I~r:lrh ( I) to theComminee on Banking.. 
]'!ou:-ing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Commillee on Financial Services of the HOlLse 
of Representatives. 
S. 10S(d) is coupled wilh s, 108(a). which r~l]lIil"l':s FASB :md any other approved standards-
selling body 10 adopt procedures assuri nf! promptl'tlllsideration of new rule~ reflecling 'i nterna-
lionnl convergence on high quality accounting st:mdards.' 
" Office of the Chief Accountant. Oflice or Economic Analysis, SEC. Study Pursuant to 
Section IOS(d) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adopt ion by the Uni ted Slates Finnllcial 
Reporting System of a Principles- Based Accouting. Sy:-tem (J uly 2003). avail abl e a t <http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/st udies/principlebasedstand .htl1l> [hereafter cited as SEC Rl.'fJo/"/1 (last 
visited 26 January 2004). 
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This Article enters a dissenting opinion. The dissent does not follow from a 
theoretical preference for rules over principles, however. [n theory there need be 
nothing objectionable in an initiative that privi leges principles over rules in the 
articulation of accounting standards (or, for that matter, any other regulation). 
Principles, or in lawyer's parlance 'standards'. lead to more responsive and 
flexible regulation. The lawmaker announces a broad-brush directive in the 
expectation that more particular instructions will derive from law to fact applica-
tions over time. Because the principle guides each application to fact, principles-
based standards allow regulators to stay in closer touch with ultimate regulatory 
objectives even as they allow for variations in the facts of the cases. In contrast, 
rules-based systems tend toward formali sm, even as they also tend to include 
statements of overarching principles. Whatever their motivating principles, 
exhaustively articulated rules that treat, categorize and distinguish complex trans-
actions invite mechanical application. In practice, the statement of the rule can 
come to dominate both the wider regulatory purpose and the particulars of (he 
given case. Problems result, since no system of rules ever can anticipate all future 
cases. Clever planners exploit the pattern of mechanical application, devising 
transactions that fit the pattern but evade the regulation's spi rit. US GAAP is 
justifiably famous for reliance on such rule-based treatments. 
In the abstract, then, well-drafted principles may offer a better mode for 
articulating accounting standards. Unfortunately, the US reporting system's 
infirmities cannot be cured in the abstract. GAAP's rule-based treatmenrs and 
(he proposed move to principles must be evaluated in the process context in 
which preparers and auditors apply accounti ng principles. The process picture 
is not pretty. Professional standards have fallen to such a low estate that a near 
term shift to a principles-based sys tem would create a significant risk of unin-
tended adverse consequences. 
Management decides on accounting treatments and prepares financial 
reports. Auditors merely review these deci sion s. '~ It follows in theory that 
auditors should be the most independent and adversary of professionals, ready 
at all times to reject management's treatments as unfair or noncompliant. 
Unfortunately, in US practice, corporate clients have captured the loyalty of 
their audilOrs to a degree comparable to their capture of the loyalty of their 
lawyers. Multiple factors contribute to this compromise of the professional 
relationship. Prime among them are non audit consulting rents, employmenl 
I. The leading discussion of the resul ting incentive problem in the legal literature is M.A. 
Eisenberg. 'Legal Models of Managemem Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, 
Directors and Accountams· . 63 Clil. L Rev. (1975) p. 375. Eisenberg's critique continues to 
resonate in 2004. 
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opportun iti es at clients, and audit industry concentralion. ' ~ Now, had the 
Congress enact ing SOA been se rious about realigning auditor incent ives and 
ame liorating their capture by the client interest, the statute would have prohib-
ited all nonaudit forms of bus iness consulting by audit firm s. SOA, more 
cautiously, opts for gradual improvement th rough periodic profess ional rev iew. 
It facilitates audit reform without assuri ng it , leaving it to the PCAOB and the 
SEC to address (or finesse) the problem of industry capture. 
So long as management incentives respecting accounting treatments and 
auditor independence remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor 
plausibly positioned to take responsibility for the delicate law to fact applications 
that are the hallmarks of principles-based systems. Principles, taken alone, do 
lillie to constrain rent-seeking behaviour. In a world of captured regulators, they 
invite app lications that suit the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their 
flaws, beller constrain managers and their compromised aud itors. 
Principles-based accounting Illay work well in other corporate governance 
systems or in the US sys tem at some fu ture time. But Congress and the SEC 
move too qu ickly in prodd ing FASB to move immediately to principles-based 
GAAP. Priorities here need to be ordered wi th more care. The incenti ve 
problems should be solved first through institutional reform that insulates the 
audit from the negative impact o f rent -see king and solves the adverse se lection 
problems that otherwise impair performance of the audit fun ct ion in the US. 
SOA, with ilS blank check agency delegation, merely starts the reform process. 
It does not take the concomitant and necessary step of reasserting professional 
standards. Broadbrush reformulations of rules-based GAAP should follow on ly 
when institutional reforms have succeeded. 
This Article ' s subsequent sections proceed as follows. Section 2 traverses 
the US reporting cri sis, situating the ru les verSLI S principles debate in the 
context o f recent audit fa ilures. The di sc ll ss ion shows tiwi the wave of audit 
fai lures implicates principles-based GAAP much 11101'1: than it implicates rules-
based GAAP. A story ahout Enron Ill uch in L'i rclilation also is fa lsified. 
According to the story, Enron exe lllpli fi es the :lbuses 0]" rules-based accounting 
under GAAP and demonstrates the 11 L'~d (\lI1lIlVC III principles. In reality, Enron 
violated whatever accounting stand:lrds got in it s way, whether structu red as 
rules or pri nciples. Respons ibility for lilt.:' di saster does not lie at the door of the 
drafters of GAA P but at the doo r or those responsib le for implementation and 
enforcement, Enron's managers and auditors. Section 3 explains why GAA P, 
which in fac t is founded on principles, has evolved towards art iculation in rules. 
The respons ibility lies less wi th FASB, which has been operat ing as a 
" The effects of industry concentration are:'1 mallcr of debate. For the view th • .lI intense price 
competition among audit firms has contributed to tow audit qU:l li ty. see te;l; ! accompanying n. 65 
inJm. 
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responsive regulator, than with its constituents. The constituents, the preparers 
and auditors of financial statements, demand rules. Adverse selection problems 
in their professional relationships motivate the demands. Section 4 compares 
rules and principles in the second-best world of US audit practice. Rules hold 
out cost savings and can enhance transparency. Principles make things simpler 
and enhance the comparability of financial statements across different finn s. 
The problem is that principles presuppose an independent auditor who holds 
unmitigated professional power over the client and its treatment choices. In the 
absence of such an actor, the case for a principles-based regime rests on a false 
premise and holds out ri sks for audit quality. Section 5 concludes. 
2. RUL ES, PRINClPL ES, AND AUDIT FAILURE 
Proponents of principles-based accounting blame audit failures and reporting 
defalcations at firms like Enron and WorldCom on rules-based accounting and 
look to principles-based reformulations as a corrective tool. The rules, they say, 
are manipulated by managers, auditors, and consultants toward the end of 
reporting misstatement. A principles-based system, such as presently in effect 
in the United Kingdom and in IFRS, would be less manipulable and thus 
superior. No one challenges these assertions. But, as the discussion that follows 
shows, the charges are in significant part unfounded. This is not because GAAP 
contains no manipulable rules, for it does. Nor is this because the rules have not 
been manipulated, for they have been. It is because recent corporate scandals 
for the most pan do not stem from rule manipulation. There is no persuasive 
causal connection between rule-based GAAP and recent, catastrophic audit 
failures. Enron t thought to be the prime case where corporate failure can be tied 
to rule exploitation, turns out to be much more a case of human pathology than 
of poor standard setting. 
2. 1 Standard setting and audit failure 
According to the SEC's report under SOA on principles-based accounting, 
rules-based standards are characteri zed by 'bright line tests, mUltiple excep-
tions, a high level of detail, and internal inconsistencies.' A rules-based 
approach, moreover, seeks to supply a clear answer to every possible situation, 
thereby minimizing the need to apply professional judgment. 'h According to 
GAAP's critics, this leads to transaction structuring and other strategic 
I. SEC Report. op. cit. n. 13, s. I.e. 
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behav iour that undermines the qua lity of fina ncial repo rt ing. 'J Financia ls thus 
ma ni pu lated, while rule compliant, do not truly and fairl y slate the reporting 
company ' s income and fin ancia l position. Comparability suffe rs as a resu lt ; 
Reponing entiti es hewing to the same stri ct standa rd appear comparable on 
faces o f their fin ancia ls when their arrangements in fact are di ssimilar. " Princi-
ples, say the c riti cs, avoid thi s reporti ng pathology and lead to higher quality 
reporting; an effective system of accounti ng standards must bui ld on principles 
and cannot be constructed entire ly of rules. 
The c riti cs are ri ght that effective accounting sl;lIldards must have a basis in 
principles. Unfortunately for the line of criti c ism. howcver, GAAP exemplifies 
just such a system. GAAP is not comprised sole ly of rules, although some of its 
direct ives are indeed set out in elaborately slaled ruks rl'plL'lL' with bright- line 
tes ts, Illultiple exceptions. and internal incoll sistl' llc il' s. Many GAAP standards 
are pri nciples-based. Furthermore, <\ ("ol icc lillil Ill' hroad and powerful princi-
ples stands behind the whole. I" FASB . upon ils illL'l.:plion in 1973, art icula ted 
" K. Schipper. ' Principles-Basell A~'CPlHlt jng Standards', 17 An:owllillg Hori:,()1/S (200 .1) p. 6 1. 
I> Ibid .. p. 67. 
'" These :lre. accordi ng tn ;1 k;ld ing legal accounting text. historic.1I cost. objectivity (or 
verifiabili ty), revell ue recognition. m'ltching. consistenry. full di sdosure. :lIld relev:lI1L'e (or fnir 
value). O.R. Herwitz and MJ . Barrt! lt, An'Ollllrillgfnr LlIIl"ye/".I': MlI/t' ria{.\·. 3'" edn. (New York. 
Foundation 2002) PI'. 67-70. The Inst principle on the list. rail' value. lately has been growing in 
im porta nce al the t!xpensc of the fi rst two on the list. historical cost and veri fin bility. See 
generally Fitwncial Accou nti ng Standards Board. Prclilllillarr Vii'lt ·.'· Oil MojoI' /s.l"II('.\" Re/med /0 
Reportillg Fill(///cia/ //l.I·/rlllllelll.\· (//1(1 C('J"will Rt"lmnf A.l"Sels (/Ild Liabili/ies (If Foil' Volue ( J 999): 
S. SiegeL 'The Coming Revol ution ill A(xol1ntillg: The Emergence of Fair Val ue as the Funda-
men tal Princ iple ofGAA P·. 42 WnY/l(.' L. R('I". ( 1996) p. 18.19. Tension resu lts - there is no way 10 
have :r system requiring verifinbl e numbers and nt the sa me time offe ring fair va lu e ligures. That 
tension is being resolvcd in favour of fa ir value as GAA P moves :lway rrolll a mandate that all 
reported numbers be hard numbcrs toward a system including m;II1Y numhe rs that result from 
judgment cnlls but that in theory offer n beller picture of the pro::sc nt v; lluc nf the linn . Note that 
SOA s. J08(a) directs FAS B 10 prioritize the cOllsidcJ";lt i(ln nf IlCW ru les rdlccting 'emerg ing 
accounting principles and changing business praclices.' Thi s pn,:sllllwbly mean s more movement 
\0 fair va lue t reatment .~ . T he Congress overlooks the fact thaI the same movement certainl y 
played a role in the accounti ng mess at Enron. where n';lr~ It I mar~et and f<li l" v.tlue 'lCl'ollllting or 
its derivative and energy contr'll'ts contributed mi gh tily III .\l l ~(lil· i (lns 'lbuu t ils e:trn ings fig ul"es. 
See F. PartnllY. 71:.\"1;1111111.1' 8<:/111"(' 111(' Set/ale (',1/I/llIil1l ' I' (II/ Cm'cn/lllellTaI AJJi lirs {SS RN 
working paper IIA Rev i .~ i on i .~1 View of EnrOll amI the Sudtkn Deal h of "May". available al 
<htl p:llpapc rs.ssm.colll/soi.1/papers.cfm?absl r;ll·l_ id;:::-I I 726 I > (lasl visited 26 Janu<lry 20(4) II. 
COlllmon sense indic:Hes that we should read.iu'it Ihe balance in favour or verifi abi lit y. at least 
until the crisis has passed. 
Other tcnsions come into the pi r ture whcn In' i"cl"crence two modifying l'Ol1ventions-ma teri-
:tlity. which lets the audi tor disregard minnr mi s' lpplications of the rules. and conservati sm, 
whic h coun se ls underslatement ill l'nse of dOllbt. Between hi ~lo r ic:l 1 cost. verilinhility. and 
I.:onscrvatislll 0 11 the Olle IMnd , ,md fair va lue alld nlllteriality on the other. there is mllc h room for 
good faith dispute ,tbout the best w~ly Itl :-:late.1 firm's results. 
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GAAP's basic principles in a series of Concepts Statements, 2/) collectively 
called the conceptual framework. This has ever since been the source of the 
objectives and concepts drawn on in the development of US accounting 
standards.21 The overarching concept in the conceptual framework is 'decision 
usefulness'. It is in turn supported by the trio of relevance, reliability , and 
comparability.~2 Decision usefulness is achieved in the first instance through 
comparability. That is, similar transactions and conditions should be reported 
the same way by different ftnns and by each frnn across time. The achievement 
of comparability in turn necessitates standard setting. Relevance and reliability 
come into the framework at this point to assist the standard setter in articulating 
requirements for recognition of income, measurement of assets and liabilities, 
and disclosure more generalIy.~J As articulated within the conceptual 
framework, GAAP is explicitly principles-based, even as it contains many 
rules. 
A critic might respond that other accounting systems manage to do as good a 
job as does US GAAP with materially greater reliance on principles than on 
rules. The UK regime often is held out at this point. As to auditing standards, the 
UK system does appear to be more principles-based than those in the US.24 But 
the picmre is less clear with respect to the UK's substantive accounting princi-
ples. British accounting rests on eight Financial Reporting Standards, twenty-
five Statements of Standard Accounting Practice, plus a thick supplementary 
literature. Much of this is as dense and rule-bound as US GAAP.2~ The same is 
true of lFRS.2b One commentator, reviewing a number of systems for relative 
rule-based complexity, including those of the US, the UK and IFRS, found no 
obvious reason to distinguish US GAAP as a pathological outlier.27 All 
accounting systems mix rules and principles. 
More importantly. there is no clear causal connection between rules-based 
US GAAP and recent high-profile reporting failures. Those who denounce 
GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a number of subject matters. These 
:ru For FASS's discussion of these in the context of the principles based accounting movement 
of 2002, see FASS. Principles-Based Approach to u.s. Standard Setting, No. 1125-001 (2 1 
October 2(02) pp. 5-7 [hereafter cited as FASS. Principles Approachl . 
~I See FASS. Staremelll of Financial Accounting Concepts No.1, Objective of Financial 
Reporting by Business Enterpri.ses (November 1978). 
:: See FASS, Statement of Financial Accollnting Concepts No.2, Qualitative Characteristics 
of Accounting lnformation (1980) . 
:J Schipper, loc. cit. n 17, pp. 62-63. 
:'.' See c.A. Frost and K.P. Ramin. 'International Accounting Differences ', 181 J. Acct. 
(1996) p. 62. 
!.' L.W. Cunningham, 'The Sarbanes·Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Refonn (And It 
Just Might Work)" 35 Conn. L Rev. (2003) pp. 9 15, 975-76. 
!,. See SEC Report, op. cit n. 13. s. l.F. 
~J Cunningham, loc. cit. n. 25, p. 976 n. 291. 
, 
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core, rules-based regimes include accounting for derivatives and hedging 
activity, leasing, real estate sales, stock-based compensation arrangements, 
consolidat ion (or other recognition) of related entity financ ial assets and liabi li -
ties, and, prior 10 reforms instituted in 200Z/ x mergers and acquisitions . .!'! The 
General Accounting Office 's (GAO) recent report of public company 
accounting restatements permits us 10 gauge the ex tent 10 which these rules-
based subject matter figures into the spate of accounting failures. Since 
accounting restatements presuppose audi t failure, the GAO's compendium 
provides a road map to accounting's abused territories. 
The GAO report shows that the annual numher of restatements rose from 92 
in 1997 to 225 in 200 I. From 1997 10 June 2002. the total number of restate-
ments announced was 919 :~1 These involved X45 companies, amounting len per 
cent of all those li sted on public exchanges ill the US. Issues involving revenue 
recognition, whether in respect of misreported or nunreported revenue, made up 
the larges t group by subject matter category. accounting for almost 38 per cent 
of the 9 19 restatements:" The second largest group concerned cos t or expense· 
related issues, accounting for almost 16 pCI' n: nt . ,. ThL' GAA P revenue and cost 
recognition standards bearing on this S4 per CL' lli majority group are for the 
mos t part principles-based - they are phrased in ~e l1 e r; i1 terms and require 
signirica rll exercises of judgment in the ir ;lppl ica t i(lll . " WoridCom is the most 
famous recent case of these principks' opportunistic misll se . Over three yea rs 
WorldCom shifted around $8 hill ion or lillL' L'UstS (lver to ;ISSct accoun ts. 
treating operating expenditures as capital exp~ nditures, with earnings for the 
period of the shift increas ing dollar for dol lar. This age-o ld ruse for padding 
earnings implicated neither high·tech eng ineering nor manipulation of complex 
rules. '-I It was a bad fai th appl ication of a principle. 
T he remaining restatements cover a range of subject matter, some of it rules· 
based, but most of it principles-based. On the rules-based side are restatements 
~ See F ASS. Sralemellf of Filu/ltc:ia/ ACCOI"'lillg S/(mdards No. 141, BIf.~·illes.\· CO/llhillllfioll.\· 
(J une 200 I) (ending pooling treatment for mergers) . 
. '" SEC Report. op. cit. n. t3. S5 . I.G. II.B . 
• , GAO Rep(JI"I , op. cil. 11 4. 
" Ibi d . 
. ': Ibid. These types of restatemcnts include instances of improper cost recogn ition. tax issues. 
and olher cO~Hel<lled improprieties that led to rinancialmisstateme nls . 
. 1l Herwitz & Bao·ctt. op. cil. n. 19. pp. 449-462. 474-482. The generat principles are supple· 
menlcd by industry specific ru les. The door for Ihi s supplementat ion is opened by FASB 
Concepts Statement No.5. which bases the revenue recognition standards on thccJosing practices 
of its time. But il provides lillte further concepl ual basis. FASB has a current project that looks 
toward a conceptual restatement. See Schipper. lac. cit. n 17. p. 63 . 
. \J For description of this fraud . see Clinn ingham. op. cit. n. 25. pp. 934·36. 
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concerning merger and acquisition accounting and derivatives:\~ More on the 
principles~based side lie restatements involving in-process research and devel-
opment, related-party transactions, loan-loss reserves and loan write-afts, asset 
impairment, inventory valuation, and restructuring activity. Jt, 
There is a simple reason why rules-based subject matters do not dominate the 
list of restatements: Detailed rules hold out roadmaps both to GAAP compli -
ance and the identification of GAAP noncompliance. Observers who disap-
prove of the rules-based treatmentsJ7 dislike the reporting destinations to which 
the roadrnaps lead. Since these destinations tend simultaneously to be favoured 
by the managers of reporting companies, the managers happily comply with the 
rules. At the same time, a noncomplying issuer is more likely to confront an 
uncooperative auditor. Detailed rules hold out the benefit of enhancing trans-
parency even as they can distort the overall story told by the report 's bottom 
line. They make it easier to see what companies are doing, if only for the reason 
that the precise instructions narrow the room for differences of judgment. J~ 
Rules also ease verification. Detailed instructions provide a base of common 
assumptions and knowledge for both preparers and auditors. Differences in 
measurement decrease as a result. Noncompliance becomes more evident. oW 
And the auditor who discovers noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let it 
pass given a rule. The rule provides it a clear-cut basis for justifying the refusal 
to the client, minimizing potential damage to the professional relationship. 
Since the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it al so increases the risk of ex 
post enforcement respecting the preparer and the auditor both, further 
strengthening the auditor's resolve. 
" GAO Report. toc. cit. n. 4. Derivatives are a growth item on the list of restatements. Along 
with other securities-related restatements. they increased from 4.6 per cent of restatements in 
2001 to 12.4 per cent of restatements in the first half of 2002. Butlhe category is capacious. and 
includes errors and misstatements involving derivatives. warrants, stock options. and other 
convertible securities. Some of the standards in question are rules-based, while others are 
standards-based. Significantly, most involve fair value accounting . 
... Ibid. 
,\7 See M.W. Nelson, J.A. Ellion, and R.L. Tarpley, 'Where Do Companies Attempt Earnings 
Management, and When Do Auditors Prevent It ?' This working paper is available at <http:// 
papers.ssrn.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstrac1_id=248 129> (last visited 26 January 2004) (showing 
that auditors pass on these treatments as GAAP compliant) . 
. " As noted above, 10 the extent the rule strategic transaction design, comparability may be 
losl as dissimilar transactions receive common treatment. Schipper, loc. c it. n. 17, pp. 67-68 . 
.. See ibid., p. 68. 
Rules. Pri"ciple,~ , and 'he America" ACCOllllfillg Crisis 19 
2.2 Enron and GAAP 
Those who asc ribe rules-based standards with a causal role in the accounting 
cri sis point to Enran. At first g lance the citation appears justified . Misleading 
accounting treatments of transactions between Enron and off-balance sheet 
entities lie at the scandal' s core, and the applicable accounting standards are 
rules-based. Indeed, these rules' form over substance treatments are as notori -
ously arbitrary as any in US GAAP. 
Criti cism of these rules has been widespread for decades. Even FASB 
consistently has joined the criti cs. For two decades prior to 2001 it kept open a 
project inquiring into an alternative approach bui lt on a principles-based defini -
tion of control. .lO' Unfortunately for FASB, the business community, particularly 
the securiti za tion industry, had come to rely on it s ll1astery and manipulat ion of 
these rules, especially the labyrinthine se t on transfers to off-balance sheet 
entities. The industry interests vociferously opposed reform . Exhaus ted by the 
opposition, F ASB abandoned the project of SUDst;IIlI i vc restatement as a failure 
even as the Emon scandal was breaking. Laler. in the wake of the scandal , 
FASB' s critics did an abollt face, sudden ly demanding pri Ilciples-based reform. 
FASB responded by reviving the re forl11 projec t. and has since produced a 
succession of Enron-responsive ex posure draft s. " FASB 's revived reform 
project amounts to a tacit admission of standard sell ing failure. For all that 
appears, even the body respons ihle for GAAP agrees that its rules had a 
causative role in the company's collapse. 
1n ac ting out the ro le of a defi cient lawmaker, FASB confirms the conven-
tiona l wisdom circulating in the wake of Enron 's co llapse. This story fo llows 
from the assumption that a disas ter of th is magnitude never could have occurred 
had there not been a !law in the rules. The story has it that Enron exploi ted 
technica l rules govellling Special Purpose Entit ies (SPE) in setting up and 
accounting for sham transactions . By carefull y but cynically hewing to the 
rules, Enron managed material ly to overstate its earnings. Had the rules been 
beller drafted, Enron wou ld have been forced to consolidate the results of the 
~, Sec FASB. C(JII.l'Olhlllled Fil1lll/cial SlaTemenls: Pili/illSI' (ll1d Policy (proposed 23 
Febru ary (999). 
" FAS B. COlI.wlilJali(J/1 (!f Cerlain S{}(!ciol PJlI'po.I'£' Elllilic.~ - (III IlIIerpl'eWliol/ (jARB N(J. 
5 J (proposed I July 20(2). Thi s dran deals wifh SPEs and wou ld have caused the consolidation of 
Enron' s LJM I and 2. It also increases the outside eq uit y requirement 10 ten per cenl for a residual 
class of SPEs Ihal would hnve included those in question . A second init intive addresses disclo-
sures of guarantee~. on the purport that the present rules lad clarity. FASB.II1IClpr/!wlioll No. 45. 
GI/ammur·.\' An'uulllillg Oisdosure Reqllir('II/(,lIls.frw Glll/ rall/ees. Im:llldillg III(lirel.·/ Gmlrt/II-
lees of 'lldeblellileH orOlhers (25 November 2(02). 
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sham SPE:;: with its own results. Consolidation in turn would have deprived 
Enron of the opportunity to misstate its earnings. ~1 
Generalizing from the story, rules-based GAAP's layers of precise instruc-
tions easily can be manipulated by clever and expensive accountants and 
lawyers. Had GAAP taken a principles-based approach, articulating general 
and substantive standards respecting the consolidation of related entities, there 
would have been no loophole through which the bad actors at Enron could have 
dri ven their fl eet of sham SPE trucks. 
The story is accurate in one respect: the rules respecting accounting for trans-
actions wi th SPEs were badly drafted and incomplete. But in all other respects 
the story is nonsense. Enron, in fact, did not follow the rules, Had it done so, the 
substance of all of its questionable dealings with SPEs would have been 
disclosed in its financial statements. It follows that the rules did not fail. The 
failure lay with aCLOrs at Enron and its auditor, Arthur Anderson, Failures at 
FASB played no role. FASB's implic it, after the fact, admission of a rule fai lure 
te lls us more about its weakness as a political player than it does about the 
operation of GAAP.~.1 
It is true that the SPE transactions at the heart of the Enron scandal emerged 
from an exhausti ve and strategic planning process. It also is true that the trans-
actions were designed to comply with the rules even as they exploited the rules' 
structural weaknesses. Under SFAS No. 140, issued in 2000, transfers of 
financial assets to SPEs are treated as sales by the transferor finn so long as, 
among other things, equity interests in the SPE are nOi returned as consideration 
for the assets transferred and the SPE gets control of the assets with the right 10 
pledge or exchange them . .I.I For the class of SPEs utilized in the Enron transac-
tions, all the planner had to do was make sure that an outside equity investor in 
the SPE vehicle contributed capital at least equalLO three percent of the va lue of 
the financial assets transferred to the SPE vehicle by Enron. 
It also is true that at the time Enron set up the critical 'UM I' and 'LJM ll ' 
SPEs and entered into swap transactions with them, the transactions arguably 
,~ One fi nds this story casua ll y mentioned as accepted wisdom in the pages of the New York 
Tillle.l· at the end of 2002. See K. Eichenwald. 'A Higher Standard for Corporate Advice' , NY. 
'l'illl£,.\' (23 December 2002) pp. A I, A 20 (quoting Professor Frank Part noy as follows: 'Enron was 
lill lowing the letter of the law in nearly all of its deals. It is fair to say that Ihe mOSI seriOliS allega-
tions or criminal wrongdoi ng al Enron had almost nOlhing to do wi th the company's collapse. 
Illslt! ;ld it was the type of transaction that is still legal. ') . 
I ' Significantl y, reporting companies and the big accounti ng firms (notably incl uding 
'\Illli.:rsell and Enron , see G.R. Simpson, 'Dea ls That Took Enron Under Had Many Supporters', 
111<11/ SI . .I. (10 April 2002) pp. A I. A I 3), vigorously opposed FAS B's consolidat ion project, criti-
,'l/ lIlg lil t! FASB's draft as unworkable. S. Burkholder, 'Accounting: Outlook 2002' ,34 Sec. Reg. 
,~ '- /<" (1 . (2002) pp. 2 14, 215. 
" Fi\SB. SIIIIIIIIGI)' of SWlemel/1 No. }40. ACCOlllllil1g for Trallsfe rs a/ld Sen'icillg of 
/111,1111 illl ;h .\'('I.\· IIlId Erlillguislimems of Liabililie.\· (September 2000). 
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complied with the rules. But, as subsequent investigations have detailed at 
length , the transaction structures had intrinsic Oaws and went o ut of compliance 
with the three per cent rule very soon after the transact ions closed . .!.' Had Enron 
scrupulous ly followed the rules at that point. it wou ld have been forced to 
consolidate the SPEs into its finan cials. Had the SPEs been consolidated, the 
outcomes of the swap transac tions between EnrOll and the SPEs wou ld have 
been eliminated from Enron's income statement with the result that Enron 
would not have been able to pump Li p its net earnings with revenues and gains 
from SPE transactions. But, of course, the finallcia ls were not consolidated and 
EnrOll overstated its earnings by $ 1 bi llion over fi ve quarters. But the noncom-
pliance did not result froJ11the successful manipulat ion of flawed rules. Instead, 
like Parmalat's managers on the other side of the At lan ti c, Enron's managers 
resorted to the old fas hioned expedient of concealment. 
EnrOll 's Ilnancia ls would have been out of compliance with GAAP even if 
the financials' treat ment of its swaps with LJM had conformed to the rules on 
conso lidat ion of financia ls. Consol idation was not the only compliance 
problem implicated by the LJM transaction st ructure. Under SFAS No. 57, 
contracts between Enroll and the LJM SPEs were ' related party transactions'. 
T his category incl udes transac tions with a counterparty whose policies are so 
in lluenced by the fi rst party as to prevent one of the parties from full y pursuing 
its own interes ts. Given such a tie, spec ial foo tnote descriptions of the transac-
tions are required. including dollar amount impacts on reported earnings. J h The 
footnote di sclosures would have provided investors with the substantive equiv-
alent of a set o f consolidated reports. But, of course, Enron did not wish to make 
clear the truth respect ing this component of it s reported earnings, and it s coop-
erative audilor fail ed to insist that it fo llow the rules on related party 
transactions . 
An add it ional reporting failure fi gured prominently in Enron's final 
col lapse. The straw that broke the camel's back, fru strated a last-d itch rescue 
plan, and forced the company to Il le for bankruptcy in Decemher 200 I was 
Enron 's the last minute reve lat ion of $4 billion of unrep0 ri l:'d ccntingent guar-
antees of obligations of unconsol idated equ ilY affi liatcs. The revd ~J ti o n killed a 
bailoutmcrger with Dynegy because the hidden $4 hillion o f o bligations mate-
rially impaired E nrOll 'S fin ancial cond ition and Wl'l'L' "hOlltto come due . .n As to 
these obliga tions GAA P ho lds oul a cil:;lr inslrw .. :lion. To guarantee an eq uity 
affi li ate's obligations is to take thL' disclosurL' IrL';lI ment out of the parent -
subsidiary or parent- investee cont(:x t I'm tr(: ;ll rnL'llt under the standards on 
" W.e. Powers. Jr .. et al .. 'Report of l nve~li~ali~)I] hy the Special In vestigative Comm ittee of 
the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.' aV<1il::lbk al 2()02 WL 19S0 IS (2002) p. 9S. 
". FASB. SllI l l'lIIelll No. 57. Re/ufed Pllrry /)i.\'I'iO.l'IIfl'.I", paras. 2. 24(1') (March (982). 
" Bra((on.loc cit. n. 2. Pl'. 1320-1.125. 
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contingent losses. Those standards call for disclosure. Under SFAS No.5, loss 
contingencies are divided into three classes: probable, reasonably possible, and 
remote. Probable losses should be accrued as liabilities; reasonably possible 
losses should be disclosed in footnotes with infonnation as to nature and 
magnitude; remote losses need not be disclosed. There is a separate rule for 
financial guarantees such as Enron's. With guarantees, even if the possibility of 
loss is remote , there must be footnote disclosure as to nature and arnount.~~ 
Enron failed to make those disc losures because it was afraid that disclosure 
could trigger a rating agency downgrade to below investment grade status. 
(Enron needed an investment grade rating to run its trading business and did 
everything it could to maintain one). This included material understatement of 
its obligations as guarantor. This amounts to another old-fashioned fraud by 
concealment. It comes as no surprise that, thus stated, Eoron 's financials did not 
comply with GAAP." 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the central problem at Eoron lay 
not with the rules themselves but with the company's failure to follow them. 
The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules' structural shortcomings but 
from the corruption of Enron's managers and perverse financial incentives that 
inclined its auditor towards cooperation. 
The conventional wisdom errs in a second respect as well. The story blames 
the complex rules on accounting for SPE transactions. It asserts that had FASB 
adopted a principles-based approach to consolidation of related entity financial 
statements, Eoron would have been disabled from perpetrating its fraud. Unfor-
tunately for the story, the complex rules governing SPEs in SFAS No. 140 
applied in full only to mainstream transactions, like the securitization of pools 
of mortgages. Enron's SPE transactions did not flow in the mainstream 
governed by SFAS No. 140. They instead fell into a category of 'other' SPE 
,. See F ASB, Statemellf of Financial Accollllfing SflIndar(/s No.5, Accoulllin8 for COllfingen-
cies (March 1975) para. 5: 'The Board concludes that disclosure of [guarantees of indebtedness of 
others and others that in substance have the same characteristic] shall be continued. The disclo-
sure shall include the nature and amount of the guarantee.' See also FASB, Interpretation No. 34, 
Disclosure of Indirect Guarantees of IlIdebledne.5S of Others (March 1981): Herwitz & Barrett. 
op. cit. n. 19, pp. 617-20. Note that under SFAS No. 140, a separate recourse obligation against 
the transferor of an asset to an SPE in respect of reimbursement for losses on the underlying 
ponfo1io (as opposed to a derivative arrangement) continues 10 be treated under SFAS No.5. ThaI 
is, Ihe transferor makes an ongoing assessment of the amount of the loss in its financials rather 
than adjusting the obligation to fair value and reponi ng it in income. Ernst & Young, Financial 
Reporli/lg Developments; AccOImlillgfor Transfers and Servicing of Fillancial Assets and Extin-
guishments of Liabilities - FASB Stalement 140 (May 2001) p. 29. 
"" And therefore were per se misleading for securities law purposes. See 'Administrati ve 
Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series ReI. No.4', 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (S.E.c. 
1938). codified in ·Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, s. 101 ', reprinted in 7 CCH Fed. 
Sec. L Rep. para . 72,921 (18 May 1988). 
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transac tions not covered in their en tirety by FASB standard-setting, For trans-
ac tions in the residual category, the criti cal requirement was a minimum outside 
equity inves tment. As to this the account ing firm s used a three per cent rule of 
thumb, derived from a 199 1 letter of the Ch ief Accountant of the SEC issued in 
respect of a lease transaction ,''''' To read the 199 1 letter is to see that the SEC 
required three per cent outs ide equity fundi ng on the facts or the leas ing case 
presented to it. The agency never intended to set three per cent as a one-size-
fit s-a ll , bri ght line test. During the I 990s, the SEC repeatedly poi nted out to the 
accounting profession that no three per cent bright line lest ex isted and that the 
level of outside equity fu nding for a qua lifyi ng SPE in the residual category 
should fo llow from the nature of the transaction, In the SEC's view, the 
question was whether, on the facts of the case, sufficient Olllside equity capital 
had been inves ted to assu re the SPEs independence. " The outside equity 
requirement was rhus intended not as a rule hu t as a tlexible principle to be 
applied in the circumstances. But, th.::s pitc the agency's jawboning. the 
accounting profess ion app lied the prirlL'ipk as a th rce per cent brigh t line rule. 
That rule-based th ree per cent was the operatiw assumption when Enron 
planned the LJM transactions. 
A disturbing pattern of com lllunica ti ve breakdown and noncompliance 
emerges. A standard-setting agency articulates a principle and tell s US <l uditors 
to apply it as such, The auditors instead bowdlerize the standard so that it 
operates as a check-the-box rule. At the level of practice, then , US audi tors 
manufacture rules where rules do not ex ist. A number o r quest ions fol low . Why 
do US aud itors display a refractory preference for rules? What preven ts audi tors 
from applying standards as intended? Will the behaviour patlern persist under 
the new pri nciples-based regime projected by GAAP reformers? Responses to 
these ques tions follow in sec tions 3 and 4, 
2.3 Summary 
GAAP' s fo rm and content do need improvement and take some of the blame for 
the US accounting cri sis. There can be no denying that prac titioners often take 
advantage of GAAP's rule structures when they design aggressive treatments. 
Regulatory arbit rage - the practice or structuring an inappropri ate transac tion 
q, The GAA P authorities arc EITF Topic D- 14. 'Transactions involving Spec ial Purpose 
1 ~ llliti es·. EITF 90- 1 S, ' Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors. Residual Value Guarantees and Other 
Provisions in Leasing Transaclions' , and EtTF 96-21. ' Implementation Issues in Accouming for 
I.casing Transactions involvi ng Special Purpose Entities '. 
" See OJ. Ragone III. 'Current Accounting Projects'. 2000 Con/en'lIce 01/ SEC Del't!lol" 
1111'111,\· (4 December 2000), 
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so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule~2 - c learly is widespread. But these 
rule-based aggressive treatments, which tend to involve structured fin ance, 
leases, and (until recently) pooled mergers, do not show up in large numbers on 
the list of recent restatements. The reason is that the rules make the treatments 
GAAP-compliant, even as many observers disapprove of the treatments. 
The audi t failures and restatements fo llow less from regulatory arbitrage 
than from strategic noncompliance - action under an interpretation of the law in 
conflict with Lhe stated interpretation of the regulator. n Neither rules nor 
standards prevent such conduct, and, as between the two, rules have the 
advantage in deterring it. Meanwhile, in every case of a restatement, GAAP by 
definition has proved adequate to the job of identi fy ing the misstatement and 
providing corrective instructions. Under this analysis, the drafters of SOA were 
right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed {Q the cri sis but 
wrong in diagnosing the problem as legislative. This is not for the most part a 
problem concerning the relative merits of rules and principles in standard 
setting. It is instead a problem of professional practice in a regulatory system 
made up of both. It is the auditors who need to gel back to principles, taking 
seriously principles already governing the reporting system. 
3. THE DEM AND FOR RULES 
We have seen that US GAAP literally foll ows from general principles. Yet it 
has become more and more rules-based as articulated over time. This is not 
because its general principles no longer motivate particular GAAP standards, 
but because US accounting's constituents constantly and effectively register 
demands for tailored treatments. The propensity {Qward rules follows from a 
supply and demand dynamic between the standard-setter, FASB, the audit 
finns, and their managemem clients. 
The demand for rules fo llows from auditing clients' constant des ire for 
exception from rules. When an accounting principle articulates a treaUTIent 
category and a set of reporting companies dislike the way the LreaUTIent applies 
[Q them, they (and their auditors) lobby for an exception. One means to the end 
ofpennitted deviation from the mandated treatment is a 'scope exception' - a 
rule that rule excludes stated transactions or items.SoI GAAP's complex deriva-
tive rules provide a good example, with their nine exceptions to the definition of 
derivative, several of which carne into the rules solely for the purpose of 
l~ See T. F. Malloy, ·Regulation and the Compliance Nonn' , UCLA Law School worki ng 
paper, 2003 (on file with aUlhor). 
'.' Ibid . 
.w Schipper. loco ci t. n. 17, pp. 66-67. 
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reducing preparation cost s. ~·\ Alternati vely, constituents request and anain 
' trea tment exceptions' - special rules for defined items or industry practi ces. 
Rules faci li tating income smoothing provide a prominent example:'" Hav ing 
won thei r rule-based exceptions, the constituents then request detailed instruc-
tions respec ting implementation .-'1 FASB responds, and GAAP becomes still 
more complex. 
3. 1 FASB: the responsive standard setter 
GAA P has ve ry close formative ties to the profess ion thaI applies it , ties closer 
even than those between US legislatures and judges and the legal professionals 
who advise corporate c lients. Government mandates dictate much of the advice 
lawyers give to c lients. But the government , although heavily populated with 
lawyers, operates at arm 's length from the legal profess ion. Accounting, in 
contras t, operates like a guild both at the legislati ve and at the profess ional 
leve l. Auditors apply law generated within their own profession, operating at 
closer quarters with the pertinent lawmaking instituti ons than do lawyers. 
The governance structure of FASB de monstrates this prox imity. At first 
g lance it appears designed to prevent the large auditing firms from dominating 
the body that makes GAAP. Public accountants may fill no more than three of 
FASB 's seven seats, with the remaining four seats being taken by two corporate 
executives , one fin ancial analyst, and one academi c.-~ On further cons ideration, 
however, the four to three split does not provide a credible guarantee aga inst 
special interest influence. Auditors and corporate audit cl ients will have a 
community of inlerest on most ho t button standard setting issues. FAS B, by 
coupling three auditors with two corporate executi ves, assures that this 
community of interest has a fi ve-to-two voting advantage. FAS B also is il very 
small shop, with a staff of only forty- fi ve. For funding, it has historically re lied 
on the charitable support of the large audit firm s, along with a tri ckle of 
revenues from publication sal es. ~'J Add all of this up, and the structure does not 
guarantee robust institu tional independence for GAA P's standard se tter. 
With th is incent ive proble m in mind, let us revisit FAS B' s wi thdrawal orits 
two decades old project looking toward a suhSl<lncL'-ovc r-form approach to 
" Ibid. p. 66 . 
.. , Ibid . 
'I Ibid. p. 67. 
" Herwilz & Barren. op. cit. n. 19. PI' 154- J 56 . 
... [bid .. p. 54. Meanwhi le. the Emergi ng IsSUI!S Task Force. which since 1984 has had the job 
of pronouncing on culting-edge requests for :Iuv ice on appropriate treatrnerus. is a group 
populated almost entirely of representat ives or the large firms. [bid. p. 157. 
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defi ning control and imposing consolidation. foe) Why did FASB give up? It 
seems unlikely that the decision followed from ajurisprudential commitment to 
rules-based accounting. More likely FASB abandoned the project because it 
expected a shift to a standard to trigger voc iferous opposition from reporting 
companies and the large audit firms because it would have had a restraining 
effect on the structured fin ance. Securitization is a billion dollar industry. 
Auditing firms participate as consultants. Reporting companies securi tize their 
assets to enhance their bottom lines. Market intermediaries draw enomlOUS 
revenues from making the deals. To the extent that a new consolidation regime 
would have chilled deals by changing accounting treatments, all of these actors 
would have gone straight to the barricades to protect the status quo. FASB , after 
years of being greeted with threats from lobbyists and attack dog congressmen 
whenever it tried to improve anything, was entitled to be a little gun shy in the 
face of strong demand for the status quo respecting consolidation. 
It should be noted that corporate managers do not have the power simply to 
dictate GAAP's terms. GAAP rule-makings are much contested, despite 
FASS's structural weakness and management's capture of the auditor interest. 
Indeed, FASB has conducted itse lf with admirable independence in recent 
years, taking positions opposed to those of management and the audit profes-
sion on key issues like the treatment good will arising in mergers and manage-
ment stock options.M Sut FASS ' s structural weakness does bear on the rules 
versus principles choice in day-to-day standard setting. When empowered 
constituents present F ASB with a standard-setting problem or pose a question 
about a proposed standard, in either case asking for a solution in the form of a 
scope or treatment exception, they often get a sympathetic hearing. 
US GAAP accordingly presents a cognisable capture problem. GAAP in 
many respects results from an internal conversat ion, wi th no institutional 
mechanism assuring that the public interest trumps the interests of audit firms 
and their clients in its promulgation. Asymmetries of information and method-
ological wherewithal aggravate the problem. GAAP is a body of law structur-
ally shielded from outside inspection. Monitoring GAAP is difficult - to know 
what is going on respecting substantive issues in accounting is to be a member 
of the guild in the firs t place. 
Solidarity within the accounting profession aggravates the problem. This 
profession closes ranks when a major conflict breaks out between it and the rest 
of the economy. Among the multitude of talking heads from the business world 
that provided the US media wi th its sound bites during recent corporate cri ses, 
none were partners from the large auditing firms. Even as the rough and tumble 
.. , See SI/pra n. 40 and accompanying lext. 
nl A. Levitt, Take On the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don't \Yam YOII/O 
K,wI<.'. What You Can Do /0 Fight Back (New York: Random House 2002) pp. 106- 11 5. 
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world of public policy discussion suddenly occupied itself with GAAP and the 
audit profession, the audit firms stayed s il ent. /'~ The silence hardly stemmed 
from disinterest. It instead served to preserve information asymmetry - the less 
said about audit practice outside the profess ion the better. Industry concentra-
tion augments accounting 's professional solidarity. There remain only four 
firm s left with the wherewithal to conduct audits of large capitalization 
companies. In a uni verse of four organizations, discipline is easily maintained. 
The legal profess ion in the US , with all its fault s, displays no comparable 
solidarity. For every lawyer who closes ranks wi th a corporate client, there is 
another lawyer looking to bring suit against that first lawyer' s c1iem, or, alterna-
ti ve ly, to get the legislature to authorize a lawsuit. When the corporation' s 
lawyer goes to Capi tol Hill to ge t the client protective legislation, the trial 
lawyers also are there, working the other side. When lawyers advocate for their 
cl ients in public, they are understood (0 be acting in a special role. Any repre-
sentations they make on clients' behalf concerning the state of the law are 
greeted with scepticism. Indeed, critique usually is assured , for a second lawyer 
wi ll be charged with articulating the opposing view. 
Accountants operate differemly as a profess ion; even as they have come 
more and more resemble lawyers in playing an advocacy role for their clients. 
Where with lawyers the advocacy appears in briefs and memoranda of law, with 
accounting the advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients' 
certified financials. Readers of financial reports have not been on notice to 
bring sceptici sm to bear, at least until very recentl y. And those who do proceed 
cautiously get only indirec t means with in the repofts' four comers with which 
to sort numbers influenced by advocacy fro m harder numbers unjnfluenced by 
management' s agenda. This does not go to say that finan cial reports always are 
taken at face va lue. In theory , Wall Street's fin anc ial analys ts play the critical 
fun ction. Unfortunately, in recem prac tice they too have lacked the incentive to 
criticize./'\ Nor can we assume that a vigorous critique will emanate from within 
the account ing profess ion, for it has no segment with a financial stake in articu· 
laling adversary positions. The entire burden of critique and con'ecl ion has 
devolved on FASB , the SEC accounting office/'"' and a handful of academics. 
"" We must put to one side Arthur Andersen's Joe Berardi no. who publ ic ly and unsuccess-
fully acted OLit the role of the CEO trying to quell an organizational conflagrat ion . 
.. , The incentive problem stems from undelwriting and o ther rent streams nowing from the issuers 
of financial repons to the employers of analysts. It is nO{ clear that the problem admits of an easy 
solution. Absent lhal comlpling rent now. it is not d ear that resources exist to support an adequate 
llow of critical analysis. Restating the point. reform implies a new plicillg stmclUre for the audit. 
,,' The SEC had the power 10 impose accou nting rules prior to SOA. See 15 U.S .c. ss. 77(a), 
7Hrn(b)( I) ( 1994). The SEC exercises ils power only rarely. prefenillg 10 leave the job to FASB. 
:ll"! ing. under Ihe threal of intervent ion should the SEC's preferences nOI be satis ried. Herwi tz & 
Barrett. op. cit. 11 . 19. p. t46. 
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3.2 Audit Firm Demands 
Auditors are inclined toward cooperation with their cl ients and will tend to 
support their clients' reporting objecti ves. Competition for consulting business 
aggravates the inclination. Auditors also are disincl ined to say no to their 
clients. Jt follows that before so doing they will seek the backing of a precise 
negati ve instruction in GAAP. The rule denudes the negati ve response to the 
client of any suggestion that the nay-saying stems from the auditor 's own 
profess ional judgment. The ex ternal authority takes the blame. Under the 
prevailing relational pattern , audit cl ients balk at negative auditor demands 
absent a precise writtenjuslification: 'Show me where it says I can ' t do th is." '\ 
This profess ional dynamic generates a high demand for rules. 
The profession's fear of enforcement entanglement strengthens the prefer-
ence. Wi th an open-ended principle, both the preparer and the auditor make a 
judgment respecting a law to fact app lication. Risk averse actors in this posture 
will be wary of second-guessing by regulatory authorities."" They fear that the 
good faith they bring to the principle 's application will be unverifiable expos,. 
Principles , then, make i1 hard to minimize enforcement risk. 
It follows that 11 high demand for rules could persist even in the wake of an 
across the board ban on nonaudit consulting. Recall that the 'check-the-box' 
allegation against rules-based GAA P can be res tated in positive terms: Rules 
enhance veri fiabili ty, causi ng a decrease in di fferences in measurement and 
making non-compliance more ev ident . Now assume, as some assert,h' thaI the 
audit fi rms engage in intense price competition (even as the number of firms 
equi pped to audit large capitalizat ion companies has decreased to four and quite 
apart from competition for consulting rents). Such price competition could 
come at the cost of audi t quality. To see why, hypothesize the incentives of an 
audit partner under pricing pressure. Under Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards, the audit process begins with an appraisal of the ri sk of compliance 
failu re at the client . The auditor's profess ional judgmenl concern ing the scope 
of the testing to be conducted in the course of the audit fo llows from this ri sk 
appraisal. '>· The scope of the tes ting in tu rn impacts on the audit fee - as the risk 
increases, more tests are needed, more ti me must be spent, and the fee rises. 
Rules recommend themselves over principles in a hard cash sense at this point 
in the scenario. Check-the-box verifiability gets the job done more quickly and 
", SEC Reporr, op. cit. n. 13. s. III.I. 
'", See ibid ., s. I.e. 
"' See S. Sunder, 'Rethinki ng the Structure of Accounting and Aud iting' . Yale ICF Worki ng 
Paper No. 03-17 (29 May 2003) (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/ 
papers.cfrn?abstracUd=41358 J » (last visited 26 January 2004). 
'" Herwi tz & Barrett. op cit. 11 . J 9. pp. 200-203. 
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predictably, maki ng it eas ier to state a price in advance and lock in a profit on 
the engagement. Under a regime of principles, the preparer wi ll have made fac t 
sensitive applications of the standards, necess itating a more labour-intensive 
audit. With principles, unexpected, time-consuming problems also are more 
like ly to arise. In sum, professional price competition, (0 the extent it exists, 
also fu els the demand for rules. 
3.3 The legal profession compared 
US aud itors, in demandi ng rules from their standard se ller. (rack the actions of 
US lawyers; and US GAAP, in evolvi ng away from hroad principles toward 
ru les, tracks the evol ution of US business law as a whole. Before telling their 
clients that a course of action is proh ibi ted. lawyers al so seek an explici t 
statutory bar or a case on all fours. Business law and lawyers no longer 
subscribe to the legal realists' view that fact spccirk adj udication under princi-
ples makes law more responsive.'" As an ex ample. compare the o ld Uni form 
Parlllership Act/" drafted early in the twent ieth century, with a Revised 
Uni form Parlnership Act," drafted at the end of the century. The fonn er is a 
collec tion of short, general statements. The latte r is a labyrinthine affa ir that 
reads li ke an atlempt to answer every ques tion that ever arose in thi s history of 
partnership governance. T he evol ution of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) and the cases thereunder over the last three decades has worked 
si mila rl y. New legislati ve drafts of the uee add layers of complications. 
Today 's drafters no longer leave it to later case law to fill in the detail s. 1nstead 
they pursue the impossible dream of creating complete sets of instructions, just 
like the accountants . 7~ Meanwhile, courts applying the uce have abandoned 
general ideas like liberal construction H and good faith. 7" 
Many reasons for business law's movement to rules can be suggested. Confi -
dence in judicial decision-making has declined even as the expense of litigating 
ques tions of interpretat ion has risen . 1n commercial law contexts the scope of 
jury control over mixed law and fac t questions expanded materially over the 
'" See W.W. Bratton. ' Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn ' . 26 J.COI]),L. 
(200 I) pp. 737. 746. 
~, Uniform Partnership Act. 6 ViA 275 ( t 9 14). 
'I Revised Uniform Partnership Act 6 UIA 1 ( 1997). 
,; Compare the origi nal UCC Art. 9 and the revised Art. 9 on the perfec tion and prioJities of 
seclLI'i ty interests. See UCC 5S. 9-30 t-9-318 3A ViA 859- t037. 38 VIA 33-386 ( 1972); UCC ss. 
9-30 1-9-342.3 VIA 154-30 1 (2000). 
l\ See G.E. Maggs. ' Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Ju risprudence of the Unifonn 
Commerci,,1 Code', 71 U. Culo. L ReI'. (2000) p. 54 1. 
" W.W. Bratton. 'Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Controt' . 
100 Micll. L ReI'. (2002) pp. 89 1. 933-934. 
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latter part of the twentieth century, destabilizing the expectations of business 
people. There also circulates a general notion that specific instructions import 
certainty that enhances economic welfare. Finally, lawyers, like auditors, turn 
to rules because they want (Q reduce risk both for themselves and their clients. A 
rule imports a safe harbour and control of future events where a standard does 
not. 
To sum up, GAAP and business law have moved to rules simultaneously. 
Auditors, lawyers, and clients alike demand clear instructions, putting the 
burden of clarity on the lawmaker. They thereby relieve themselves of the 
burden of making judgments under uncertainty. Such judgments take time, cost 
money. and disrupt client relations. This is not a healthy development. But the 
fault lies neither in the proliferating rulebooks nor their drafters. The fault 
occurs at the point of demand: Drafters will continue to generate rulebooks until 
the demand ceases. Actors in practice will perceive the rulebooks to be inflex-
ible and burdensome only wi th the cessation of the forces generating the 
demand. 
4. RELATIVE MERITS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES: IDEAL CONDITIONS 
AND INCENTIVE INCOMPATIBILITY 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the auditor-client demand for 
greater rule specificity ceases, freeing us to interrogate in a neutral policy space 
the question whether GAAP should be articulated in rules or principles. The 
result will depend on the inquiry 's further assumptions. If an ideal professional 
environment is hypothesized, in which the auditor works unconstrained by 
pressures of time, price, and reputation, a strong case can be stated for a princi-
ples-based regime. But a plausible case can be stated for rules even under such 
ideal conditions. The case for rules strengthens materially in an imperfect insti-
tutional framework, such as that prevailing respecting the audit function in the 
US. 
4.1 Cost savings and transparency 
Rules-based accounting entails cost savings and enhances transparency. The 
cost savings follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards 
govern homogenous, recurrent situations where the actors need ex ante instruc-
tions and have incentives to invest in compliance. 7' Such conditions tend to 
justify a rules-based approach. An across-the-board shift to principles would 
1.' See L. Kaplow. 'Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis'. 42 Dllke Ll. (1992) 
pp. 557. 570-77. 
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make sense on ly if the costs of constant revision of the rules to keep up with 
unintended app lications due to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage 
outweighed the benefits of advance specification. GAAP does not appear to lie 
anywhere near that level of dysfun ction. On this analys is, the indicated course 
of reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules' 
operation looking to periodic amendment, adjusting categories so that reporting 
resu lts follow from the rules' operat ive principles . 7~ 
Transparency imports a second j ustification for rules. Recall that rule 
compliance is more eas ily verified than principle compliance. 71 It follows that 
rules decrease the risk of audit failure even as they import inflexibility. 
Rules enhance transparency for users of fi nancial statements as well as for 
auditors. To see why, revisit the legal realists' case for principles over rules in 
respect of private law adj udication. That case presupposes that the law to fact 
appl icat ion is explained and published in ajudicial opinion. The reported cases 
give the pract itioner an expanding body of fact sensitive appl ications, ever 
better art iculating the standard 's meaning. Over time, the accumulated case law 
offers the practitioners a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rulebook, 
even as the principle's flexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thus the 
substance of the legal regi me) are open for public inspection. 
The ongoing rules-based arl"icu lation of GAAP by FASB and other public 
bodies works similarly . 7~ But the appl ication of open-ended accounting princi-
ples by reporting firm s and audi tors does nol. Financial statements and 
footnotes are very summary documents. Deci sion maki ng about treatments 
goes on in a black box, evolving as a matte r of practice amongst insiders."N 
There is no comparable moment of transparency respec ting the law to fact 
application. Thi s diminishes the chance for outside evaluation. These law-to~ 
fact decisions, meanwhile, are not made by j udges empowered by the state. 
They come from the preparers - the regulated ac tors themselves - acting with 
an input of the auditor's professional review. And a professional , even one 
historically conceived to be in an adversary posture to its client, is in a materi -
ally different position from a j udge. Adj udicatory authority imports absolute 
1 •• The rule might be overinclusive; that is. it might bring in:tppropriatc transactions into a 
given "lone of treatment. A rule also might be underinclusive; that is, il might allow a transaction 
Ihal should be included in a Irealment calegory to be structured so as nOllo be included. See C. R. 
Sunstein . 'Problems With RUles'. 83 Cal. L Rev. ( 1995) pp. 953. 995. 
11 See lext accompanying n. 37 supra. 
1. According 10 FASB, any bias toward rules in contemporary GAAP sterns from exactly Ihis 
sort of law-to~faci development process. as rules are rewrillen 10 take into account different 
transactiona l facls and interpretive opinions accumulate. FASB, Principles ApprO{IC/I. op. cit. n. 
20. pp. 3-4. 
,., The three per cent rule applied to SPEs provides a good example, see SIII"'(j text accompa-
nying n. 50. 
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power to say no. The outside professional can only suggest no, on pain of giving 
up the client. 
When confronting substandard fin ancials, loday's auditors are disinclined 
even to threaten to walk, much less actually to forego the rent flowing from the 
audit engagement. A serious incentive problem results, a problem that makes a 
move to fl exible, open-ended principles ill advised at this time. 
4.2 Flexibility and professional judgment 
The case for principles-based accounting arises in large measure from the 
description of the perverse effects of rules. The principles case admits the force 
of the rules case but asserts that once rules come to dominate the accounting 
regime, cumulative perverse effects cause the disadvantages of rules to 
outweigh the advantages. The more detailed the set of exceptions, the greater 
the chance that essentially similar transactions receive different accounting 
treatments. Scope and treatment exceptions build inconsistencies into the 
standards, sacrificing the integrity of the underlying principles. Strategic 
behaviour results, as preparers seek to exploit the inconsistencies, designing 
compliant transactions that subvert the principles the rules supposedly effec-
tuate. Meanwhile, the proliferating exceptions fuel additional demand for expli-
cation from the standard setter. The responsive standard setter finds itself 
attempting to articulate a treatment for every conceivable scenario. But the 
auempt always fails, for the goal of a perfec t, exhaustive rulebook is unattain-
able.1IO 
The case for principles at this point reverses the case for rules. Since the 
standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situations ex ante, it is not 
clear why exhaustive instructions should be he ld out as a goal in the first place, 
given that micro-level standard setting always results in inconsistencies. The 
only party with all information respecting a given transaction is the reporting 
company itself. It follows thatlhe company's preparer, operating in good fai th , 
is more likely to derive an appropriate treatment when applying a principle than 
is a rulernaking standard setter acting ex ante. With principles, company-
specific knowledge and the regulatory framework interact fl exibly and the 
regulation's purpose is more likely to be effectuated.~ ' 
Thus described, principles-based accounting not only permits but also 
requires exercises of professional judgment by auditors and actors at reporting 
companies. R2 Sir David Tweedie, chairman of the lASB , stressed the importance 
.. , SEC Report, loc. cit. n. 13, s.l.e. 
" Ibid., s. I.D. 
01 Schipper. loco cit. n. 17, p. 61. 
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of professional judgment in a principles based system in hi s 2002 Congres-
sional testimony: 
'We favour an approach that requires the company and its auditor to take a step back 
and consider whether the accounting suggested is consistent with the underlying 
principle. This is not a soft option. Our appro<lCh 1\~q Llires both companies and their 
auditors to exercise professional judgment in ti ll' puhlil' interest. Our approach re-
quires a strong commitment from preparers to i"inancial statements that provide a 
fai th ful representation of all transacti ons and a strong l'Ollllllilment from auditors to 
res ist client pressures. It wi ll not work withoutlhl'sl' L'o llllnitments .. .'K.' 
Having heard the case for principles, we must rl'! urn III til l' audito r-cl ient rela-
tionship to inquire into the expected quality or pnllcssillilill judg ments. If recent 
hi story is predicti ve, the prognosis is not good. 1':vL' 1l as iluditors have been 
disempowered with respect to the ir c li ents. so IIll' l'liL'llIS ha v..: bl:l: 1l guided by 
short-term so lic itude for the ir s tock pricl:s ratlll'l' than i"iddity 10 illTounting 
princ iples. Proponents of princ iples seem 10 hc li l'Vl' Ih ;ll rdorlllulatin g. rules 
into standards by itse lf solves these problell is. (jUI thl: bl:\ icl' is unfounded. The 
recent hi story of aud it failure has been no respecte r or princ iples . It w ill take 
more than a new approach to sl<lnd<lrd se tting bring incentive compatibility to 
thi s compli ance environment. 
The SEC displays sensiti vily to thi s problem in its SOA re port on principles-
based account ing. The report' s defini tion of an ideal princ iples-based standard 
makes an inte res ting compari son wi th Sir David Tweedie's approach: 
.... [T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard involves a conci se statement 
of substant ive accounting princi ples where the accounting objective has been incor-
porated as an integral part of the standard and where few, jf any, exceptions or inter· 
nal inconsistencies are included in the standard. Further, such a standard should 
prov ide an appropri ate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of the 
c lass of transactions or events and should be devoid of bright-line tests. Finall y, such 
a standard should be consistent with , and deri ve from , a coherent conceptual frame-
work of financ ial reporting. ,<, 
Where Tweedie lays the responsibili ty for law to fact determina tions squarely 
on the regulated actors, the SEC hesitates. It takes a step back from the case for 
principles to endorse constituent demand for speci fi c ity. It then shifts the 
burden back 10 the standard sette r to provide 'an appropriate amount of 
"' Testimony of Sir Duvid Tweedie Before the Senate Comrnillee on Banking. Housing and 
Urb'lIl Affairs ( 14 February 2(02). 
"' SEC Report, op . cit . n. 13. s. I.e. 
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implementation guidance.' Bald statements of principles, says the SEC, 
provide users insufficient structure in which to frame their professional 
judgment. The 'principles' need to be 'defined specifically.' The SEC calls this 
an 'objectives-oriented' approach to principles-based standard setting. As an 
exemplar, it holds out PASS's recent revision of the standard for mergers. ttI 
The regime envisaged by the SEC appears to hold out the benefit of a 
decrease in the level of reporting detail. At the same time, comparability of 
treatment across different issuers would be enhanced. But the decrease in 
complexity implies a concomitant loss of transparency, since commonality of 
treatment obscures particulars in the economics of differing underlying transac-
tions.M The SEC sees these as matters to be traded off by the standard setter: 
'[T]he task of the standard setter [is] to determine the trade offs among 
relevance, reliability, and comparability C ... ) in ( ... ) an effort to find the "sweet 
spot,,· 87. Two additional SEC instructions to the standard setter stand out: (1) 
economic substance should drive the development and scope of the standards,&!! 
and (2) no scope and treatment exceptions should be conceded. 89 
A question must be asked about the SEC's vision of accounting standards. 
How does the regime simultaneously articulate precise instructions and eschew 
all exceptions from its categories? So doing would amount to a considerable 
achievement. The drawing of lines is intrinsic to regulation. Line-drawing is 
what case law under principles is supposed to do. It is not at all clear that 
financial reporting principles differ from any other body of regulations in this 
regard. So, to the extent the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all 
standards mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disap-
pointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any other regu-
latory context.1IO The search for 'sweet spots' is better consigned to sporting and 
other physical activities. 
The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards that incorpo-
rate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the rubric of principles-
based accounting. The system envisioned more accurately would be character-
ized as a one of tough, general rules.9 1 Such a regime holds out advantages. For 
example, it presumably would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments 
tolerated in recent years, particularly those facilitating earnings management. 
But if this is the SEC's intent, a question arises: In the present political and 
~ Ibid , s. I.C. I.E. 
~ The comments in the text draw on FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20. p. 7. 
~ Ibid . 
.. Ibid . 
... Ibid, s. IV .D. 
'OJ See FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20, p 6. 
,,' FASS's Proposal respecting Principles in effect warns audit firms and issuers of this when 
il poinls out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earni ngs figures. Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
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institutional contex t how likely is it that reporting companies, their audirors, 
and thei r fr iends in Washington would permit FASB to use the rubric of princi-
ples-based accou nting to usher in a new era of strict treatments? Even as the 
PCAOB takes steps to regulate the audit profess ion, the answer must be, ve ry 
unlikely. 
As a practi ca l matter, then, the projected move to principles will have to be 
arr iculated in the form of general but flexible guidelines - what lawyers call 
'standards. "" 
Choices of trea tment will have to be made and the quality of preparer and 
aud itor judgments wi ll matter. The SEC warns that principles-based accoun ting 
implicates a more expens ive, time-consuming audi t process. The SEC antici-
pates that , in order to review preparer judgment s, audit firm s will have to hire 
ex pe nsive personnel with experti se in complex transactions. II al so anticipates 
that active audit comm illee overs ight and olher strong enforcement agents wi ll 
be required if the system is lO work . Finally, it advises auditors and preparers to 
generate ex tensive paper records respecting treatment decisions so as to 
pos ition themselves to defend their good faith .'" 
In effec t the SEC asks users of financial statements to trust in the effec tive-
ness of the PCAOB to create a compl iance environmcnt vc ry different from the 
one prevailing - a wonderful new wo rld o f accounting. The ques tion is not 
whether the regime it projects would he an improvc llll' llt on the status quo; it 
would be. The quesLion is whet her the ideal world thus projl'l· tCtl is J"c;'ls ible in 
prac ti ce without unintended e ffects in the form of poor profess ional judgments. 
It is too soon in the US reform process for an affirmati ve answer. 
5. CONCL USION 
US GAAP, even as il has moved to rules, continues to contai n many principles 
and holds out many choices of treatment. Independent auditors are supposed to 
make reference 10 the principles in filling in the inevitable gaps in the rules and 
in answering ques tions of interpretation under the ru les. Such law to fac t appl i-
ca tions should with some frequency have been leading auditors to say no to 
aggressive treatments chosen by their clients. But such nay saying has not been 
the practi ce. Appl ication o f principles in the manner contemplated requires 
exercises of judgment , exercises thai captured auditors are di sabled from 
'J: D. Kennedy. ' Form and SubslJnce in Private Law Adjudication', 89 HmT. L ReI'. ( 1976) 
p. 1685. offers the cla.~s ic description of .~tandards in American jurisprudence. America' s princi -
ples-based accounting advocates would be well advised to read it. 
," SEC RI!I,urr. op. cil. n. 13. s. 111.1. 
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making. Principles-based accounting only works when the actor applying it 
takes responsibility for its judgments. 
The US accounting crisis stems less from the form of GAAP standards, 
whether rules- or principles-based. than from their application to fact and 
enforcement. The system's problems arise out of the profess ional relation 
between auditors and clients. It follow s that SOA correctly prioritises profes-
sional regulation in the form of the new peADB. It is less clear that rules-based 
GAAP should be a present law reform target. Until the enforcement mechanism 
works more reliably - and the PCAOB is only beginning 10 task of correction -
a move to principles-based accounting could aggravate the crisis of confidence. 
